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INTRODUCTION 
Negotiated settlements are increasingly regarded as an alternative tool against corporate criminality, 
with numerous countries now embracing such settlements.1 In England and Wales, amidst concerns 
relating to corporate criminal liability, the government introduced deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs) in 2014. A DPA has been described as ‘a bargain under which the prosecutor undertakes not 
to proceed with the prosecution of a corporation for a fixed time in return for the defendant mending 
its ways and paying a financial penalty for the privilege.’2 Similar powers are well established in some 
jurisdictions, particularly the US,3 and they have recently been introduced elsewhere too. For example, 
France introduced equivalent powers in 2016, namely the Judicial Convention of Public Interest.4 In 
2019, French authorities issued Guidelines on this power, which are influenced by, inter alia, 
experiences from England and Wales. In 2018, both Singapore5 and Canada6 introduced DPAs directly 
influenced by experiences in England and Wales. Other countries are considering introducing DPAs,7 
including Ireland. The Irish Law Reform Commission has proposed the introduction of DPAs based on 
the regime in England and Wales, rather than that in the US.8 Thus, five years on from their 
introduction in England and Wales, it is timely to re-examine the DPA regime, not least given its 
influence on developments in other jurisdictions.    
DPAs have been welcomed as a pragmatic response to corporate crime9 and, in the words of 
the House of Lords Select Committee, are ‘an excellent way of handling corporate bribery’.10 They are 
not uncontroversial, however. For example, there are concerns that companies are enabled to 
negotiate, or buy, their way out of prosecution11 and that negotiated settlements impinge upon the 
presumption of innocence.12 Furthermore, unlike conventional plea bargaining – where an offender 
                                                          
1 For a recent, expansive overview, see Abiola Makinwa and Tina Soreide (eds), Structured Settlements for 
Corruption Offences: Towards Global Standards? (International Bar Association, 2018). 
2 House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010, The Bribery Act 2010: post-legislative scrutiny (HL 
Paper 303, 2019) para.233. 
3 There is an extensive literature on DPAs in the US. See, for example, Brandon Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How 
Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Harvard University Press, 2016). 
4 Law No 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 (Loi Sapin 2), introducing the ‘Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public’ 
(CJIP).  
5 Criminal Justice Reform Act 2018, s.35. 
6 Bill C-74 2018, Division 20. The Canadian legislation uses the term Remediation Agreements.  
7 In Australia, legislation providing for DPAs had been introduced (Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting 
Corporate Crime) Bill 2017) and a public consultation undertaken on a Code of Practice, however the legislation 
lapsed at the end of parliament (July 2019). 
8 Law Reform Commission, Report on Regulatory Powers and Corporate Offences (October 2018) p.264. 
9 Rita Cheung, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Cooperation and Confession’ [2018] Camb LJ 12. 
10 House of Lords Select Committee (n.2) para.328. 
11 Nicola Padfield, ‘Deferred prosecution agreements’ (2012) 7 Archbold Review 4. 
12 Douglas Husak, ‘Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate 
Criminality’ (2014) 8(2) Criminal Law & Philosophy 353. For a contrasting view, see Roger Shiner and Henry Ho, 
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pleads guilty in exchange for leniency at sentencing – DPAs do not require companies to plead guilty, 
thus they are not called to account for their wrongdoing in a criminal trial.13 
This article examines three key aspects of the development of the DPA regime to date,14 that, 
we argue, have resulted in a weak foundational basis for the regime notwithstanding its robust legal 
framework. Specifically, we explore: whether a DPA is in the public interest; the requirement of self-
reporting; and the terms of a DPA. Even though there are admittedly only five Agreements to date, it 
is nonetheless useful to reflect upon the lessons to be learnt from these infant years. While DPAs were 
enacted to overcome obstacles to prosecuting companies and they have been widely lauded, we are 
not convinced by such contentions. The argument advanced in this article is that practice has been 
haphazard, rather than tied to any core principles, and lacks a clear underlying purpose. This situation 
is particularly evident in the three areas discussed in this article, which leads to the conclusion that 
the DPA regime stands on shaky foundations. 
  
DPAs: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In a 2012 consultation on DPAs, a Ministry of Justice consultation document recognised that ‘[t]he 
present justice system in England and Wales is inadequate for dealing effectively with criminal 
enforcement against commercial organisations in the field of complex and serious economic crime’.15 
Key obstacles include: long, complex investigations and trials; difficulties in identifying wrongdoing; 
limited powers of enforcement agencies; and difficulties associated with the identification principle.16 
It was also noted that: ‘If more offending commercial organisations are to be brought to justice and if 
offending is to be dealt with more quickly and efficiently, the SFO and other prosecuting agencies need 
additional tools.’17 Given difficulties in successfully pursuing criminal prosecution, DPAs were regarded 
as a ‘pragmatic step to try to obviate some of the hurdles in regulating the behaviour of corporate 
entities.’18 Ultimately, DPAs would be enacted under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, and the regime 
was brought into force in February 2014.19  
A DPA is a discretionary tool whereby the prosecutor and company enter negotiations as an 
alternative to prosecution.20 In order to enter into a DPA the prosecutor must apply a two-stage test 
involving an evidential stage and a public interest stage. First, the prosecutor must be satisfied that 
the evidential stage of the Full Code Test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors is satisfied. If this is not 
met, the prosecutor must be satisfied that there is ‘at least a reasonable suspicion based upon some 
admissible evidence’ that the company has committed an offence, and that there are ‘reasonable 
grounds for believing that a continued investigation would provide further admissible evidence within 
                                                          
‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2018) 12(4) Criminal Law & Philosophy 
707. 
13 For wider discussion of calling offenders to answer for wrongdoing, see Anthony Duff et al, The Trial on Trial, 
vol.3 (Hart, 2007). 
14 i.e. up to early-August 2019. This timeframe thus includes the most recent DPA (Serco, approved in July 2019), 
the lifting of reporting restrictions in the Sarclad DPA (also in July 2019), Corporate Co-operation Guidance from 
the SFO (made public in August 2019), as well as the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Bribery Act 
published in March 2019.  
15 Ministry of Justice, Consultation on a new enforcement tool to deal with economic crime committed by 
commercial organisations: Deferred prosecution agreements (Cm 8348) (May 2012), para.23. 
16 Ibid, para.3 (Foreword).  
17 Ibid, para.30. 
18 Michael Bisgrove and Mark Weekes ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A Practical Consideration’ (2014) 6 
Criminal Law Review 416, 417. 
19 Crime and Courts Act 2013, s.45 and Sched.17; Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Commencement No. 8) Order 
2014. Currently, DPAs only apply in England and Wales: Crime and Courts Act 2013, s.61. 
20 SFO/CPS, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice (2014), para.1.1 (herein, ‘DPA Code’).  
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a reasonable period of time, so that all the evidence together would be capable of establishing a 
realistic prospect of conviction in accordance with the Full Code Test.’21 Second, the prosecutor must 
be satisfied that the public interest would be properly served by entering into a DPA with the 
company.22  If this two-stage test is passed and a DPA is considered appropriate, an indictment will be 
preferred (where the court approves the DPA) but will then be immediately suspended.23 Where the 
two-stage test is not passed, and where it is not considered appropriate to continue the criminal 
investigation, the prosecutor should consider whether a civil recovery order is appropriate.24 
The Code of Practice specifically emphasises that a company ‘has no right to be invited to 
negotiate a DPA.’25 Indeed, ‘in many cases, criminal prosecution will continue to be the appropriate 
course of action.’26 It is worth setting out in full the requirements before negotiations may be initiated: 
‘Where the prosecutor is satisfied that:  
i. either the evidential stage of the Full Code Test in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors is met, or there is a reasonable suspicion based upon some 
admissible evidence that P has committed an offence;  
ii. the full extent of the alleged offending has been identified;  
and 
iii. the public interest would likely be met by a DPA,  
then the prosecutor may initiate DPA negotiations with any P who is being investigated 
with a view to prosecution in connection with an offence specified in the Act.’27 
The prosecutor should also consider whether or not prosecution is in the public interest: ‘The more 
serious the offence, the more likely it is that a prosecution will be required in the public interest.’28 
Ultimately, applying the public interest factors necessarily involves a balancing exercise and will be a 
matter of discretion.29 
Where a DPA is successfully negotiated, it may include a broad range of terms including (but 
not limited to): a financial penalty; compensation to victims; donations to charities/third parties; 
disgorgement of any profits made; implementation of a rigorous internal compliance/training 
programme; cooperation in any investigation; and payment of reasonable costs to the prosecutor.30 
Other possible terms include prohibition from engaging in certain activities; financial reporting 
obligations; robust monitoring; and cooperation with sector wide investigations.31 The terms must be 
‘fair, reasonable and proportionate’, which will be case-specific.32 The amount of any financial penalty 
must be broadly comparable to any fine that might have been imposed upon conviction if the 
company had pleaded guilty in criminal proceedings.33 Significantly, ‘The basis of the DPA and its 
written terms will be explained in an agreed written application to the court.’34 A DPA must include a 
statement of facts, which may include admissions by the company.35 Any factual issues must be 
                                                          
21 DPA Code, para. 1.2.i. 
22 DPA Code, para. 1.2.ii. 
23 DPA Code, para.1.6. See Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.2. 
24 DPA Code,  para.1.7. 
25 DPA Code, para.2.1. 
26 DPA Code, para.2.1. 
27 DPA Code, para.2.2. 
28 DPA Code, para.2.4. 
29 DPA Code, para.2.6. Para.2.8 sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that might be relevant in deciding 
whether a criminal prosecution is appropriate or not. 
30 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.5. 
31 DPA Code, para.7.10. 
32 DPA Code, para.7.2. 
33 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.5(4).  
34 DPA Code, para.7.3.  
35 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.5(1). 
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resolved by the parties: ‘The court does not have the power to adjudicate upon factual differences in 
DPA proceedings.’36 While there is no requirement for formal admissions of guilt, the company must 
admit the contents and meaning of key documents referred to in the statement of facts.37 If the 
company is subsequently prosecuted for the alleged offence, the statement of facts will be treated as 
proof by formal admission.38  
There are two initial stages of judicial involvement in the DPA process, a preliminary hearing 
and final approval of the DPA.39 Prior to the preliminary hearing, a draft confidential application, along 
with any supporting documentation, must be submitted to the court.40 This application must be made 
after the commencement of negotiations, but before the terms of the DPA are agreed; the application 
will be for a declaration that entering into a DPA is in the interests of justice and the proposed terms 
are fair, reasonable and proportionate.41 Subject to such a declaration being granted, the prosecutor 
must apply for a formal declaration from the court that the DPA is in the interests of justice and the 
terms are fair, reasonable and proportionate.42 A DPA only comes into force following approval at this 
final hearing.43  
At any point when a DPA is in force, if the prosecutor believes that the company has failed to 
comply with the terms of the DPA then the prosecutor may apply to the court. The court must then 
decide, on the balance of probabilities, whether the company has so failed to comply. If so, then the 
court may either i. invite the parties to agree proposals to remedy the failure to comply, or ii. 
terminate the DPA.44 If, however, the DPA remains in force until its specified expiry date, then 
proceedings will be discontinued by the prosecutor giving notice to the court.45 
To date five DPAs have been approved by the courts,46 involving Standard Bank,47 Sarclad 
Ltd,48 Rolls Royce PLC,49 Tesco Stores Ltd,50 and Serco Geografix Ltd.51 These Agreements provide 
insights into the conditions required for negotiations between the authorities and implicated 
companies to take place, and the expectations of each party as to the terms of agreement. In the rest 
                                                          
36 DPA Code, para.6.2. 
37 DPA Code, para.6.3. 
38 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.13(2). See DPA Code, para.6.4. 
39 See also The Criminal Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2013, Part 12.  
40 DPA Code, paras.9.3-9.4. 
41 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.7(1). The hearing must be held in private: para.7(4). 
42 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.8(1)-(2). This application may be in private: DPA Code, para.10.4. 
There is provision for variation of the terms: Sched.17, para.10. 
43 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.8(3). Where the DPA is approved, the court must give its reasons 
in open court: para.8(6). Para.8(7) provides for postponement of publication to avoid prejudicing proceedings. 
44 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.9(1)-(3). The prosecutor must publish the decision of the court, 
and the reasons for that decision, unless ordered not to do so: para.9(5)-(8).  
45 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.11(1).  
46 Significantly, the first four were approved by Sir Brian Leveson, President of the Queens Bench Division, who 
retired in June 2019. The fifth DPA was approved by Justice William Davis in July 2019. For in-depth consideration 
of different Agreements, see Colin King and Nicholas Lord, Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime: The 
Legitimacy of Civil Recovery orders and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Palgrave 2018). 
47 SFO v Standard Bank plc (now known as ICBC Standard Bank plc), Southwark Crown Court, Case No: 
U20150854, November 30, 2015. 
48 SFO v Sarclad Ltd, Southwark Crown Court, Case No: U20150856, July 8, 2016. This judgment had previously 
been redacted, and the company was referred to as ‘XYZ Ltd’. Reporting restrictions were removed in July 2019: 
SFO News Release, Three individuals acquitted as SFO confirms DPA with Sarclad (July 16, 2019). 
49 SFO v Rolls Royce PLC; Rolls Royce Energy Systems Inc, Southwark Crown Court, Case No: U20170036, January 
17, 2017. 
50 SFO v Tesco Stores Ltd, Southwark Crown Court, Case No: U20170287, April 10, 2017. 
51 SFO v Serco Geografix Ltd, Southwark Crown Court, Case No: U20190413, July 4, 2019. 
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of this article, we focus on three issues that go to the heart of the DPA regime, namely the public 
interest; self-reporting; and the terms of an Agreement.  
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
It is necessary to consider whether a DPA is in the public interest, a factor that the court must 
determine at both the preliminary and the final hearings.52 According to the Code of Practice, 
‘Public interest factors that can affect the decision to prosecute usually depend on the 
seriousness of the offence, which includes the culpability of P and the harm to the 
victim. A prosecution will usually take place unless there are public interest factors 
against prosecution which outweigh those tending in favour of prosecution.’53 
Thus, there is a balancing exercise with the seriousness of the offending being weighed against 
countervailing factors. In each Agreement, the seriousness of the offence was a key consideration for 
the court. The response of the company was a significant factor, however; the company’s initial 
response after discovering the conduct in question, early engagement with the SFO, the extent of 
cooperation, and changes in ownership were factors that influenced the court in determining that a 
DPA would be in the public interest. In Sarclad, for example, the relevant factors that meant a DPA 
was in the public interest were identified as follows: 
‘the seriousness of the predicate offence or offences; the importance of incentivising the 
exposure and self-reporting of corporate wrongdoing; the history (or otherwise) of similar 
conduct; the attention paid to corporate compliance prior to, at the time of and 
subsequent to the offending; the extent to which the entity has changed both in its culture 
and in relation to relevant personnel; and the impact of prosecution on employees and 
others innocent of any misconduct.’54 
 The Rolls-Royce case gives further insight into whether a DPA will be in the public interest or not. 
The conduct in question was undoubtedly of a serious nature, and there were aggravating factors.55 
Notwithstanding, Leveson P considered that there were ‘strong countervailing considerations’56 
justifying a DPA, including: Rolls-Royce had been extremely cooperative; the company had also 
reached agreements with authorities in other jurisdictions; the company had taken significant 
corporate compliance steps after the offending; change of culture and personnel; the consequences 
of conviction were considered (though Leveson P stressed that these were not determinative); a 
negotiated settlement would avoid significant expenditure of time and money that would be inherent 
in a criminal prosecution; and a settlement in this instance would incentivise other companies to self-
report.  
In considering the interests of justice, and after detailing the above considerations, Leveson P 
stated: 
 ‘My reaction when first considering these papers was that if Rolls-Royce were not to be 
prosecuted in the context of such egregious criminality over decades, involving countries 
around the world, making truly vast corrupt payments and, consequentially, even greater 
                                                          
52 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.7(1)(a) and 8(1)(a).  
53 DPA Code, para.2.5.  
54 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.15. 
55 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.35. Similarly in the Tesco judgment (n.50), paras.47-48 the court identified 
various factors that pointed towards criminal prosecution. 
56 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.35. 
6 
 
profits, then it was difficult to see when any company would be prosecuted.’ (emphasis 
added)57  
That notwithstanding,  
‘I accept that Rolls-Royce is no longer the company that once it was; its new Board and 
executive team has embraced the need to make essential change and has deliberately 
sought to clear out all the disreputable practices that have gone before, creating new 
policies, practices and cultures. Its full co-operation and willingness to expose every 
potential criminal act that it uncovers and the work being done on compliance and 
creating that culture goes a long way to address the obvious concerns as to the past.’58 
Ultimately, for Leveson P, ‘the question becomes whether it is necessary to inflict the undeniably 
adverse consequences on Rolls-Royce that would flow from prosecution because of the gravity of its 
offending even though it may now be considered a dramatically changed organisation.’59 Leveson P 
concluded that a DPA would, in the circumstances, be appropriate. There are significant difficulties 
with this approach, however. The DPA Code of Practice states: ‘The more serious the offence, the 
more likely it is that prosecution will be required in the public interest.’60 The conduct at issue 
undoubtedly included serious criminal offences that, we contend, should be dealt with by criminal 
prosecution, rather than a negotiated settlement. Indeed, as Leveson P explicitly recognised, if Rolls-
Royce was not prosecuted in this instance, then it is difficult to see when a company would be 
prosecuted.61  
The ‘public interest’ factors identified by Leveson P are debateable: both cooperation by the 
company and changes in culture/personnel are factors that might be reflected at the sentencing stage, 
following criminal conviction, as opposed to avoiding prosecution.62 Being influenced by the 
consequences of criminal conviction63 is extraneous: indeed Leveson P expressly stated that ‘the 
purpose of the procurement rules is specifically to discourage corruption and they should not be 
circumvented.’64 Yet, that is the effect of this DPA. It is trite to say that a company, such as Rolls-Royce, 
is not immune from prosecution, and that ‘a company that commits serious crimes must expect to be 
prosecuted and if convicted dealt with severely’,65 when Rolls-Royce did in fact avoid prosecution 
(notwithstanding the financial penalties, discussed later).66 What we thus see is that the consequences 
of criminal conviction have led prosecutors and the judiciary to shy away from pursuing conviction.67 
Avoiding potential debarment, then, can be seen as one attraction to companies to enter DPA 
negotiations. In Serco, however, Davis J was troubled by the potential for an Agreement to circumvent 
debarment rules and explicitly declared his reluctance to engage in a quasi-political decision in that 
                                                          
57 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.61. 
58 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.62. 
59 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.63. 
60 DPA Code, para.2.4. 
61 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.61. 
62 We do acknowledge, however, practical difficulties in securing a conviction.  
63 Considerations as to the consequences of conviction were also evident in the Sarclad (n.48, para.18) and Tesco 
(n.50, para.61) judgments.  
64 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.61. For wider consideration of negotiated settlements and debarment, see 
Sope Williams-Elegbe, ‘The Implications of Negotiated Settlements on Debarment in Public Procurement: A 
Preliminary Inquiry’ in Tina Soreide and Abiola Makinwa (eds) Negotiated Settlements in Bribery Cases (Edward 
Elgar, forthcoming).  
65 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.57. 
66 This assumes, of course, that the company will satisfy all the terms of the DPA during the period that the 
prosecution is deferred.  
67 Liz Campbell, ‘Trying corporations: why not prosecute?’ (2019) 31(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 269.  
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regard.68 Significantly, the judge noted that the facts in this instance could amount to grave 
professional misconduct, which is a ground for discretionary exclusion under debarment rules.69 In 
that instance, however, a letter from a government official confirmed that the company had self-
cleaned and thus could continue acting as a supplier to government.70  
A further contentious issue in the Rolls Royce judgment is that economic considerations and 
the impact on Rolls-Royce, its employees and shareholders who would be affected in the event of 
criminal prosecution influenced the judge when considering the public interest.71 Similar 
considerations are evident in other DPAs: for example, in Sarclad the court considered ‘the interests 
of workers, suppliers, and the wider community’72 while in Tesco it was said that the impact on other 
parties (including employees, pensioners, and those in the supply chain) ‘is undeniably a relevant 
factor.’73 That, however, appears to be at odds with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.74 Despite 
protestations that such considerations are not determinative, nor are companies like Rolls-Royce 
immune from prosecution,75 the approach of Leveson P does suggest that the larger, or more 
strategically important, a company is, then the more likely it is that a DPA will be deemed to be in the 
public interest.76 Moreover,  
‘no reference was made to the victims of the corruption that Rolls Royce committed. None 
of the prosecuting authorities from the countries where bribes were paid appear to have 
been given a right to make representations to the court. And no real assessment of the 
potential harm caused by Rolls Royce’s corruption appears to have been made by the 
SFO.’77 
Furthermore, in criminal proceedings against individuals, the impact on third parties (such as family 
members) would be dealt with at the sentencing stage – not pre-trial when determining whether a 
prosecution is in the public interest.  
The contentions promulgated by the SFO are disingenuous; indeed, the suggestion that a DPA 
‘would avoid the significant expenditure of time and money which would be inherent in any 
prosecution of Rolls-Royce’78 is worrying. Admittedly, DPAs are cheaper and quicker to resolve than 
criminal prosecution, but surely the SFO did not mean to imply that the bigger the company under 
investigation, and the more complex the case, the more they would be open to settlement. Yet, that 
is exactly what happened: the SFO impressed upon the court that resourcing consideration, 
particularly in relation to investigations/ prosecutions of large companies, do influence its decisions 
whether to proceed with a case, and that in such situations it is open to negotiation. This stance, 
however, leaves a distinct sense of unease, not least given that the approach to large(r) companies 
                                                          
68 ‘For me to take a course which would amount to a favourable determination of the position of a private 
company vis-à-vis public procurement would involve me in a quasi-political decision. That is not the function of 
a judge in any context and certainly not in the context of the approval of a course which leads to a company not 
being prosecuted for serious fraud.’ Serco judgment (n.51), para.27. 
69 Public Contracts Regulations 2015, Reg.57(8).  
70 For wider consideration of debarment and self-cleaning, see Erling Hjelmeng and Tina Soreide, ‘Debarment in 
Public Procurement: Rationales and Realization’ in Gabriella Racca and Christopher Yukins (eds) Integrity and 
Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts (Bruylant, 2014).  
71 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), paras.52-57. 
72 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.18.   
73 Tesco judgment (n.50), para.64.  
74 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Art.5. Indeed the Code of Practice explicitly states that regard should be had 
to Article 5 when considering the public interest: DPA Code, para.2.7. 
75 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.57. 
76 Karl Laird, ‘Deferred prosecution agreements and the interests of justice: a consistency of approach?’ [2019] 
Crim LR 486, 496. 
77 Sue Hawley, ‘A Failure of Nerve: The SFO’s Settlement with Rolls Royce’, Corruption Watch (January 19, 2017). 
78 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.58. 
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potentially – as Reilly argues - compromises the pursuit of justice, results in inconsistency in 
application of the law, and undermines basic notions of fairness.79 
The Rolls-Royce agreement – notwithstanding the significant penalties ultimately imposed – 
confirms that corporate wrongdoing is differentially enforced. While some might argue that a DPA in 
this instance was a pragmatic approach,80 this negotiated settlement demonstrates the inability (or 
disinclination) of the SFO to criminally pursue larger companies. Moreover, the DPA reinforces 
concerns that, in the context of corporate wrongdoing, so-called smaller fish will be targeted for 
criminal prosecution while larger companies will be able to enter negotiations. Such concerns are 
evident in the conviction of Skansen Interiors Ltd.81 The company had secured two contracts after 
paying a bribe of £10,000 and promise of a further £29,000. Following the appointment of a new CEO, 
an internal investigation was initiated; an anti-bribery and corruption policy was put in place; and the 
matter was self-reported to authorities. The company cooperated with the police investigation, 
including by handing over legally privileged material. Nonetheless, the company was prosecuted, and 
convicted, under section 7 of the Bribery Act (failure to prevent bribery).82 By cooperating and self-
reporting, Skansen had expected to negotiate a DPA, but this option was not considered by the CPS 
as the company had been dormant since 2014 and had no assets to pay any financial penalty. 
However, given the company’s position, the only penalty that could be imposed upon conviction was 
an immediate discharge. Thus, the decision to prosecute in this instance has been described as 
‘somewhat needless and arguably unprincipled’.83 Indeed, as was recognised by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Bribery Act, ‘The suspicion lingers that SIL was perhaps not fairly treated by 
the CPS either in relation to the prosecution or in relation to the refusal of a DPA.’84  
Skansen can be contrasted with Serco Geografix Ltd, where a DPA was approved in relation to 
a dormant company. Significantly, though, the Agreement extends to Serco Group PLC and its 
subsidiaries.85 Thus, Serco Group PLC assumed responsibility for the financial penalty and the SFO’s 
costs. It also undertook to implement specified ethics and compliance procedures, mirroring those 
imposed on Serco Geografix Ltd by the DPA.86 As Davis J stated, ‘Since SGL is a dormant company, the 
obligations to which it is subject under the agreement are of limited value. Of genuine and substantial 
effect are the undertakings given by Serco Group PLC.’87 Indeed, without those undertakings the goals 
of the DPA could not have been realised. The undertakings by Serco Group PLC were said to strengthen 
the public interest in favour of a DPA.88 This is a significant development, and it might be expected 
that future DPAs will provide for similar undertakings by parent companies.  
 
SELF-REPORT 
In the 2012 consultation on DPAs, it was stated that:  
                                                          
79 Peter Reilly, ‘Justice Deferred is Justice Denied: We Must End our Failed Experiment in Deferring Corporate 
Criminal Prosecutions’ [2015] BYU Law Review 307. 
80 Rita Cheung, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Cooperation and Confession’ [2018] Camb LJ 12. 
81 See Max Walters, CPS secures first conviction for failure to prevent bribery, The Law Society Gazette, March 
9, 2018. 
82 See Allen & Overy, Failure to prevent bribery: guilty verdict in first contested case (March 27, 2018). Two 
individuals were also convicted and imprisoned for their involvement: CPS, ‘Company directors jailed for bribery’ 
(April 23, 2018).  
83 Peter Binning, A Bribery Act prosecution “pour encourager les autres”, CorkerBinning Blog (March 9, 2018). 
84 House of Lords Select Committee (n.2) para.226. 
85 This undertaking is provided for in an ‘Attachment A’ attached to the judgment. 
86 Serco judgment (n.51), para.41. 
87 Serco judgment (n.51), para.41. 
88 Serco judgment (n.51), para.42. 
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‘There are currently insufficient incentives for commercial organisations to engage and 
cooperate with UK authorities at earlier stages to achieve better outcomes. At present, 
the general criminal law proceeds on the basis that the only circumstances in which an 
organisation can make admissions of wrongdoing and be punished are in the context of 
criminal proceedings which result in a conviction and sentence by a competent court.’ 89 
An important aspect of the DPA framework, then, is the emphasis on (proactive) cooperation from 
companies. Indeed, the Code of Practice indicates that the SFO expects a high level of cooperation, 
honesty and proactive engagement from the company in order for a DPA to be suitable.90 And it had 
been expected that a self-report from the company would be a pre-requisite.  
The first two DPAs both involved self-reporting. With Standard Bank, for example, the bank 
engaged with the SFO at an early stage and there was extensive and frank cooperation. Indeed, 
Leveson P emphasised: ‘Of particular significance was the promptness of the self-report, the fully 
disclosed internal investigation and cooperation of Standard Bank.’91 Given that this case was 
described as a ‘template’ by the SFO Director,92 it might be expected that self-reporting, self-
investigation and extensive cooperation would be key factors in deciding to enter into DPA 
negotiations in future cases. In both Standard Bank and Sarclad, ‘the DPA followed what was a self-
report at a time that the SFO neither had knowledge of, nor known means of likelihood of learning 
about, the conduct which led to the DPA’.93 In these terms, self-reports clearly provide a mechanism 
to identifying some criminality that may have remained unknown, but this in itself is problematic as it 
implies cases are otherwise unlikely to be detected. Where self-reports do occur, companies and 
enforcement authorities may expect a swifter (and therefore less resource intensive) and more certain 
resolution to corporate criminality on amenable terms. Further, companies are incentivised to self-
report through the expectation of a more lenient sanction.94 Such benefits do not always materialise, 
however. For example, negotiations for a DPA will not necessarily be swift,95 and it is not guaranteed 
that a DPA will be forthcoming (as happened Skansen, discussed above). 
Moreover, what if the wrongdoing was particularly complex? With Standard Bank, for 
example, there was a one-off corrupt payment. If that wrongdoing had been more prevalent, involving 
more extensive culpability, and being more difficult to prove, a more rational response might well 
have been not to disclose the corrupt payment, not least given the low risk of detection. Empirical 
research on deterrence indicates that it is the certainty of punishment, not the severity of punishment, 
that is the core factor in effective deterrence.96 In other words, it is the ‘apprehension probability’ that 
affects levels of deterrence.97 The approach of the SFO, then, in the first two Agreements - where the 
importance of a self-report and cooperation was stressed – was not unexpected. Insistence on self-
reporting as a pre-condition to entering into negotiations for a DPA would send out a powerful 
message to corporate wrongdoers: come forward, cooperate, and settle the issue – or else the SFO 
will prosecute if the wrongdoing does subsequently come to light. This stance, however, appears to 
have been significantly undermined by the approach in Rolls-Royce.  
                                                          
89 Ministry of Justice (n15), para.31. 
90 DPA Code, para.2.8.2 and para.2.9.1 et seq. 
91 Standard Bank judgment (n.47), para.14. Similar sentiments were expressed in the Sarclad judgment (n.48), 
para.16. 
92 SFO, ‘Press Release - SFO agrees first UK DPA with Standard Bank’, November 30, 2015. 
93 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.21. 
94 See Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The law and practice of negotiated corporate criminal 
penalties (Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) ch.10 for further consideration of self-reporting.  
95 The Rolls Royce case, for instance, involved a four-year investigation. 
96 Daniel S. Nagin, ‘Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century’ (2013) 42(1) Crime and Justice 199. 
97 Ibid, p.202. 
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The Rolls-Royce DPA appears to be, in the words of the OECD, ‘an interesting exception to the 
rule that a self-report is a precondition for a DPA’.98 We would put it more strongly – the effect of this 
agreement (absent a self-report, and with a generous reduction in penalty) runs counter to the 
emphasis placed on encouraging companies to come forward and self-report. In this instance, the SFO 
investigation was triggered by a whistleblower, rather than by a self-report.99 It would not have been 
surprising, then, if the SFO had pursued a criminal prosecution (notwithstanding the practical hurdles 
to securing a conviction). Yet, the SFO instead entered into negotiations for a DPA. Leveson P noted 
that the absence of a self-report ‘would usually be highly relevant in the balance [i.e. between 
prosecution and DPA]’.100 However, he was persuaded that the nature and extent of the co-operation 
provided by the company should be treated as akin to a self-report.101 It should be noted, however, 
that despite such extraordinary cooperation, there have been no prosecutions of individuals and, in 
February 2019, the SFO announced the closure of the Rolls-Royce investigations (prosecution of 
individuals alongside DPAs is discussed later).102 Moreover, the conclusion that the cooperation from 
Rolls-Royce be treated as akin to a self-report is disingenuous. In the first two DPAs, the self-report 
was noted as bringing unknown criminal conduct to the attention of the authorities.103 This is an 
important element of the DPA process, which should not be undermined by treating cooperation as 
akin to self-reporting.  
The lack of a self-report might have been somewhat justifiable given the company’s cooperation 
if the issue solely related to the resolution of the allegations by a DPA. However, Leveson P went a 
step further and granted a 50% reduction in the penalty to reflect the extent of cooperation. Thus, the 
cooperation was treated as akin to a self-report and it entitled Rolls-Royce to the maximum discount 
(discussed later). This approach would appear to be disingenuous: a company can now fail to disclose 
but remain eligible not only for a DPA but also for the maximum discount. This undermines the 
incentive to self-report and the message transmitted from the SFO (namely: self-report and negotiate 
a settlement, or else face prosecution if the wrongdoing subsequently comes to light). Now the 
message would appear to be that the absence of a self-report will not be fatal to entering into DPA 
negotiations so long as the company subsequently cooperates to a high level. Indeed, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act has suggested that ‘the highest level of discount should be 
available only to a company which has self-reported and given full co-operation.’104 The most recent 
development in relation to self-reporting happened in July 2019, with the Serco DPA, where the 
interpretation of self-report was further widened. In that instance, the SFO was already investigating 
(separate) allegations against the company. As part of its internal investigation into those separate 
allegations, the company discovered emails that purportedly disclosed further wrongdoing. This 
further wrongdoing was then reported to the SFO, and this was treated as a self-report.105  
An important consideration in the context of self-reporting is that many instances of self-
reporting will involve reports by senior company executives that were not employed at the time of 
the apparent criminality. For example, the self-report might arise in the wake of regime change which 
led to discovery of the offences, subsequent internal investigations and then external self-reporting. 
Self-reports are inherently geared towards the notification of past, rather than current, criminality, 
given that those at a senior level who knew of the criminal conduct tend to have already left the 
                                                          
98 OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: United Kingdom (OECD, 2017), p.16. 
99 See Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.16, where it is noted that concerns were first raised in internet postings. 
100 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.22. 
101 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.22. See Rita Cheung, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Cooperation and 
Confession’ [2018] Camb LJ 12, 13. 
102 SFO, SFO closes GlaxoSmithKline investigation and investigation into Rolls-Royce individuals (February 22, 
2019). 
103 See text to n.93. 
104 House of Lords Select Committee (n.2) para.308. 
105 Serco judgment (n.51). 
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company at the time of the self-report (or shortly afterwards). Thus, it might be that companies will 
only self-report where the criminality is sufficiently historical for no-one currently at the firm to be 
implicated. In that case, self-reporting is unlikely to reach to those companies knowingly and actively 
involved in criminality. Thus, the DPA regime presents a cosy environment for self-reporting historical 
criminality. Further, the company then emphasises the regime change and new personnel as being 
factors that influence whether a DPA is in the public interest (as discussed above).  
Finally, it is important to consider how claims of legal professional privilege might impact upon 
the DPA process.106 Indeed, in AL107 the SFO was criticised for its approach to supposedly privileged 
material. This judicial review case related to the failure of a company (Sarclad) to provide interview 
notes, with senior executives suspected of wrongdoing, which had formed part of the material used 
by the company in deciding to self-report. The company asserted privilege over the interview notes, 
but ultimately gave an ‘oral proffer’ summary. While this summary was disclosed to defendants in 
criminal proceedings linked to the Sarclad DPA, the full interview notes were not (as the SFO did not 
have them and the company refused to provide them to the SFO). It was common ground that the 
material in question was ‘relevant and not peripheral’,108 yet the SFO did not pursue disclosure in 
accordance with the terms of the DPA following the company’s assertion of privilege (notwithstanding 
that the SFO disagreed with the stance that the notes were privileged). The application for judicial 
review was ultimately unsuccessful as, so the court held, the appropriate forum for the matter to be 
resolved was the Crown Court. Nonetheless, the court was critical of the SFO’s failure to pursue this 
material.109  
‘In short, the SFO: failed to address relevant considerations, took into account irrelevant 
matters, provided inconsistent and inadequate reasons for its decisions, and applied an 
incorrect approach to the law. These public law errors were material. If on proper analysis 
no privilege applies (either per se or because of waiver) then XYZ Ltd should simply 
disclose the interview records forthwith. There would be no need to pursue a 
cumbersome and unreliable horizontal testing exercise as an alternative. Save for our 
conclusion on proper forum … we would have quashed the decision of the SFO and 
remitted it for reconsideration.’110 
The issue of legal professional privilege was also considered by the Court of Appeal in ENRC.111  
Commenting specifically on DPAs, the court stated that the purpose of the statutory scheme under 
the 2013 Act is to encourage self-reporting and a negotiated resolution.112 The court then continued:  
‘It is, however, obviously in the public interest that companies should be prepared to 
investigate allegations from whistle blowers or investigative journalists, prior to going to 
a prosecutor such as the SFO, without losing the benefit of legal professional privilege for 
the work product and consequences of their investigation. Were they to do so, the 
temptation might well be not to investigate at all, for fear of being forced to reveal what 
had been uncovered whatever might be agreed (or not agreed) with a prosecuting 
authority.’113   
                                                          
106 Given word limits, it is not possible to consider wider issues of legal professional privilege. For discussion, see 
Bankim Thanki et al, The Law of Privilege (OUP, 2018, 3rd ed). Our intention here is simply to outline matters that 
have arisen in relation to privilege and DPAs.  
107 R (AL) v SFO [2018] EWHC 856. 
108 Ibid, para.78. 
109 Ibid, para.95 and 124. 
110 Ibid, para.125. 
111 Director of the SFO v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006. 
112 Ibid, para.115. 
113 Ibid, para.116. 
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Furthermore,  
‘to determine whether a DPA is in the interests of justice, and whether the terms of the 
particular DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate, the court must examine the 
company’s conduct and the extent to which it cooperated with the SFO.  Such an 
examination will consider whether the company was willing to waive any privilege 
attaching to documents produced during internal investigations, so that it could share 
those documents with the SFO.’114  
In the context of the facts in ENRC, the court noted that had it been asked to approve a DPA in that 
case ‘the company’s failure to make good on its promises to be full and frank would undoubtedly have 
counted against it.’115 Significantly, then, a different approach now appears to be adopted by the SFO. 
In Serco, for example, the SFO requested that Serco Group PLC and its subsidiaries should not 
interview any witnesses while the criminal investigation was underway. Instead, an independent law 
firm was appointed by the company to conduct a full document review and to provide the SFO with a 
detailed report of the findings. The company also waived (some) privilege in respect of accounting 
material.116 Looking ahead, as suggested in ENRC,117 it might be expected that waiver of privilege will 
be a central issue in determining the extent of cooperation from a company during DPA negotiations. 
Indeed, the SFO Director has stated that waiving privilege over internal investigative material will be 
a strong indicator of cooperation and a factor when considering whether or not to enter into DPA 
negotiations. She also stated that such cooperation will influence whether a DPA resolution is in the 
public interest.118 Indeed, extracts from the SFO Operational Handbook under the heading of 
‘Corporate Cooperation Guidance’, made public in August 2019, specifically state that failure to waive 
privilege and to provide witness accounts are factors that will be influential in deciding whether or not 
to prosecute, but curiously also state that the company ‘will not be penalised by the SFO.’119 Laird, 
however, is critical of suggestions that a waiver of privilege should be required for a DPA to be deemed 
in the public interest: ‘A failure to waive privilege should not be determinative as the corporate is 
effectively being expected to waive a fundamental right.’120 Furthermore, an expectation of waiver 
might discourage self-reporting. 
 
TERMS OF DPAs 
Given that DPAs provide for the suspension of criminal proceedings against a company, the terms of 
the agreement are significant. There was (indeed, for many, there still is) scepticism that companies 
are able to negotiate, or buy, their way out of prosecution.121 As the 2012 consultation acknowledged, 
                                                          
114 Ibid, para.117. 
115 Ibid, para.117. 
116 Serco judgment (n.51), para.24. 
117 Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd (n.111), para.117. 
118 Lisa Osofsky, Speech – Fighting fraud and corruption in a shrinking world, Royal United Services Institute (April 
3, 2019). 
119 SFO, SFO Operational Handbook: Corporate Co-operation Guidance, p.5 of published extract (August 2019). 
Chapters in this Operational Handbook ‘are being redacted in line with Freedom of Information principles, to 
avoid compromising our operations, and are being published as these versions become available.’ Released 
chapters are available at: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/sfo-operational-
handbook/ (last accessed September 29, 2019).    
120 Karl Laird, ‘Deferred prosecution agreements and the interests of justice: a consistency of approach?’ [2019] 
Crim LR 486, 493. 
121 We have already expressed our concern in this regard: see Nicholas Lord and Colin King, ‘Negotiating Non-
Contention: Civil Recovery and Deferred Prosecution in Response to Transnational Corporate Bribery’ in Liz 
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‘Public confidence in the justice system is vital. The public need to have confidence that a prosecutor 
is not entering into a “cosy deal” with a commercial organisation “behind closed doors”.’122 
Significantly, though, in the five years that DPAs have been in operation, the courts have aligned to 
‘the view that that whilst a DPA is a punishment it must also incentivise.’123  
A DPA can include a wide range of terms, such as financial penalties, compensation, 
disgorgement of profits, to name a few.124 The terms of a DPA must be ‘fair, reasonable and 
proportionate’, which will be case-specific.125 Significantly the legislation requires that ‘The amount of 
any financial penalty agreed between the prosecutor and P must be broadly comparable to the fine 
that a court would have imposed on P on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea.’126 
A 2017 OECD report indicated that the Southwark Crown Court judges they visited ‘considered that 
the construction of DPAs in the UK has been quite robust and proportionate’ with ‘appropriate checks 
and balances’ for the courts.127 Moreover, initial scepticism that companies could end up ‘buying’ their 
way out of trouble have - for some - been somewhat assuaged by the size of the financial penalties 
thus far.128  
 
Table 1: Overview of DPAs 
Company Date Self-report Discount Nature of DPA 
Standard Bank plc November 
2015 
Yes 1/3 Compensation of US$6m plus interest of 
$1,046,196.58. 
Disgorgement of profit of $8.4m. 
Financial penalty of $16.8m. 
Payment of costs of £330,000. 
Sarclad Ltd July 2016 Yes 50% Disgorgement of gross profit of 
£6,201,085. 
Financial penalty of £352,000. 
SFO agreed not to seek costs. 
Rolls-Royce plc & 
Rolls-Royce Energy 
Systems Inc 
January 
2017 
No 50% Disgorgement of profit of £258,170,000. 
Financial penalty of £239,082,645. 
Payment of costs of £12,960,754. 
Tesco Stores Ltd April 2017 Yes 50% Financial penalty of £128,992,522.129 
Payment of costs of £3m. 
Serco Geografix Ltd July 2019 Yes 50% Financial penalty of £19.2 million.130 
Payment of costs of £3.7 million.  
 
                                                          
Campbell and Nicholas Lord (eds) Corruption in Commercial Enterprise: Law, Theory and Practice (Routledge, 
2018). 
122 Ministry of Justice (n15), para.80. 
123 AL (n107), para.51. 
124 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.5. 
125 DPA Code, para.7.2. 
126 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sched.17, para.5(4). 
127 OECD (n.98), p.56. 
128 See Nicola Padfield, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ [2016] Criminal Law Review 449. 
129 Separate from this DPA, the FCA required Tesco to establish a compensation scheme (of £84.4m) under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
130 A separate settlement had previously been agreed with the Ministry of Justice for £70 million: Serco judgment 
(n.51), para.21. In a further, separate settlement, Deloitte was fined and reprimanded for its audit of SGL: see 
Julia Kollewe, Deloitte fined £4.2m over Serco tagging scandal, The Guardian (July 4, 2019). 
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In the Standard Bank case, Leveson P took account of Sentencing Council Guidelines131 and 
concluded that the appropriate penalty would be 300% of the total fee which would be reduced by 
one-third to reflect the earliest admission of responsibility.132 There were doubts, particularly amongst 
legal practitioners, that this approach might not incentivise companies to self-report with the aim of 
agreeing a DPA. More specifically, there were doubts whether companies would voluntarily come 
forward given that the financial penalty would be the same as would be imposed subsequent to a 
criminal conviction with an early guilty plea.133 Significantly, then, in the next DPA, and in each 
subsequent one, the company was granted a discount of 50%.  
Before considering this discount further, we first consider the company’s ability to pay. As 
Leveson P said in approving the Sarclad DPA: 
‘At what level of criminality is it necessary simply to allow the SME to become insolvent 
and to what extent is it appropriate to mitigate the financial penalty, knowing that the SME 
is only able to make any substantial payment with the support of the substantial company 
of which the SME is a wholly owned subsidiary? On the one hand, allowing the SME to 
continue to trade (assuming necessary compliance has been put in place) is in the public 
interest but, on the other hand, nothing must be done to encourage the pursuit of criminal 
behaviour through a corporate vehicle which can be abandoned as insolvent if 
necessary.’134 
In that case, the disgorgement and financial penalty figures ‘were determined in a context where 
Sarclad has limited means and ability such that the maximum amount it would be able to provide 
towards paying any financial obligation imposed without becoming insolvent is estimated to be 
£352,000.’135 The total gross profit from the implicated contracts was £6,553,085.136 Here, the court 
imposed financial orders equivalent to that gross profit (which differed from the approach in the other 
DPAs).    
With this DPA the culpability starting point was high, but the parties submitted a (lower than 
expected) harm multiplier figure of 250%.137 Applying this figure (ie 250% of the gross profit 
£6,553,085), the starting point for a financial penalty would be almost £16.4m. In applying a discount 
for a guilty plea, Leveson P reduced the figure to £8.2m: it was felt that ‘a discount of 50% was 
appropriate not least to encourage others to conduct themselves as Sarclad has when confronting 
criminality’.138 This 50% discount is significant: not only is it higher than the one-third discount in the 
Standard Bank Agreement, practitioners welcomed it as an incentive for companies to self-report.139 
The rationale here was clear: ‘Given the self-report and admission, under the guideline, a full reduction 
of one third is justified and appropriate. In addition, given that the admissions are far in advance of 
the first reasonable opportunity having been charged and brought before the court, that discount can 
                                                          
131 Sentencing Council, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences: Definitive Guideline (2014). For further 
discussion of financial penalties in the UK, see Sprenger (n94), p.420 et seq.  
132 Standard Bank judgment (n.47), para.16.  
133 Ellen Gallagher, ‘The Standard Bank DPA – the first of many?’, International Bar Association Blog, June 9, 
2016.  
134 SFO v XYZ Limited, Preliminary DPA Judgment, Southwark Crown Court, Case No: U20150856, July 8, 2016, 
para.3. 
135 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.20. 
136 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.9. 
137 Even then, it was noted that the multiplier figure ‘was always going to be academic given Sarclad’s means 
and ability to pay’. Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.23. 
138 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.23. 
139 Lloyd Firth, ‘The UK’s second DPA: a hopeful judgment’, Economia, July 25, 2016.  
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be increased as representing additional mitigation.’140 That notwithstanding, a 50% discount feeds 
concern that companies receive preferential treatment compared to individual wrongdoers.  
Even with the 50% discount, the figure was said to be ‘wholly unrealistic’ for Sarclad; Leveson 
P then went on to consider ‘all the circumstances’141 – again here the economic considerations weigh 
heavily in the judgment. He stated that ‘the interests of justice did not require Sarclad to be pursued 
into insolvency.’142 Furthermore, ‘Sarclad’s means and the impact of any financial penalty on Sarclad’s 
staff, service users, customers and the local economy are all significant factors.’143 In the 
circumstances the court imposed total financial orders equating to the gross profit on the implicated 
contracts (i.e. disgorgement of £6,201,085 and a financial penalty of £352,000).144 In the words of 
Leveson P ‘the overall sum payable (whether called disgorgement or financial penalty) sufficiently 
marks the offending and is itself fair, reasonable and proportionate.’145 According to the then-SFO 
Director, David Green, ‘[t]he decision as to whether to force a company into insolvency must be 
balanced with the level and nature of co-operation and this case provides a clear example to 
corporates.’146 A clear message has thus been communicated to companies: if they can demonstrate 
a risk of insolvency alongside full cooperation in the investigation, this will in turn represent a 
mitigating factor even in those cases where the criminality is systematic, extensive and repetitive. It is 
difficult to imagine a scenario where full, exemplary cooperation would not be offered following a 
self-report (as happened here). 
Further problems with awarding a 50% discount became apparent in the Rolls-Royce DPA. 
While the company in this instance had co-operated to a high level, there had been no self-report. In 
such circumstances, it might have been expected that the full discount would not be applied. That, 
however, proved not to be the case. This begs the question: why should companies even consider a 
self-report now? As the OECD states, the ‘generous reduction in sentence granted by the Court raises 
a question about incentives for self-reporting.’147 A counter view here, though, is that the level of 
penalty will be clearly demarcated for companies (in contrast to criminal conviction and attendant 
consequences) which might thus provide an incentive to enter into a DPA.148 It remains to be seen 
how this discount will impact on the development of DPAs going forward. We have reservations, 
however, at the prospect that a company that does not self-report can receive such a discount.  
A separate point worth mentioning here is that there is the possibility for financial orders to 
be paid in instalments. The Rolls-Royce DPA involved considerable sums from disgorgement of profits 
(£258,170,000) and a financial penalty (£239,082,645 – which includes the 50% reduction). Rolls-
Royce requested time for payment, and the SFO accepted that point.149 However, there has been 
criticism that the repayment term is ‘overly generous’, undermines the deterrent value of DPAs, and 
could result in DPA financial penalties being regarded as a potential cost of business.150 This repayment 
term can be contrasted with the later Agreements involving Tesco and Serco, which required payment 
of the full amount within 30 days. This latter approach is, we suggest, to be preferred.  
A further contrast between Rolls-Royce and other Agreements relates to further 
investigations: in Rolls-Royce, there were assurances that ‘on approval of the DPA, [the SFO] would 
                                                          
140 XYZ Preliminary judgment (n134), para.57, referring to CJA 2003, s.144 and the sentencing guidelines 
141 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.24. 
142 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.24. 
143 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.24. 
144 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.24.  
145 Sarclad judgment (n.48), para.24. 
146 SFO, ‘Press Release – SFO secures second DPA’, July 8, 2016.  
147 OECD (n.98), p.16. 
148 Liz Campbell, ‘Trying corporations: why not prosecute?’ (2019) 31(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 269.  
149 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.128. 
150 Hawley (n77). 
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not consider it to be in the interests of justice to investigate or prosecute [Rolls-Royce] for additional 
conduct pre-dating the DPA and arising from the currently opened investigations into Airbus and 
Unaoil (which, in any event, is covered by the deferred prosecution agreement reached by Rolls-Royce 
in the United States).’151 This is problematic in that it essentially grants immunity for other illegal 
conduct by the company or its employees. In Tesco, for example, there is no such protection against 
prosecution or regulatory action for conduct not disclosed prior to the DPA nor for any future criminal 
conduct, which is a better approach than that adopted in Rolls-Royce.    
An important consideration with DPAs is whether criminal prosecutions are also envisaged 
against individuals involved in the criminal activity. Moreover, to what extent will companies assist (or 
be required to assist) the SFO in any such prosecution? In Tesco, prosecutions were envisaged, and 
brought, against individuals in relation to false accounting152 and fraud by abuse of position.153 
Ultimately, however, in December 2018 the trial judge stopped the prosecution at the ‘half-way point’ 
on the grounds that the prosecution case was too weak to be left to the jury.154 Interestingly, in 
approving the DPA, Leveson P had explicitly stated: ‘As Tesco Stores will ordinarily be the main 
repository of material relevant to the prosecution of individuals, both in terms of evidence and 
disclosure, it is obviously fair, reasonable and proportionate that it is required to assist in the pursuit 
of any investigation or prosecution.’155 Notwithstanding the assistance provided by Tesco, no 
individual was held accountable for the criminal conduct in question. Moreover, the collapse of the 
individual prosecutions could potentially deter companies from entering into DPA negotiations, not 
least given the reputational and financial consequences, as well as requirements to cooperate with 
the SFO.156 Subsequently, in February 2019, the SFO announced in relation to the Rolls-Royce case 
that: ‘Following further investigation, a detailed review of the available evidence and an assessment 
of the public interest, there will be no prosecution of individuals associated with the company.’157 
Thus, in that case also, no individuals would now be held accountable. If the cooperation had indeed 
been so extensive, as was emphasised by Leveson P, then it is surprising that there would be 
insufficient evidence to support individual prosecutions. Further, in July 2019, the prosecution of 
individuals related to the Sarclad DPA resulted in a jury acquittal.158 Thus, of the five Agreements to 
date, no prosecutions were brought in two instances (Rolls-Royce and Standard Bank), in another, 
charges were brought but these were dismissed by the judge (Tesco), another resulted in jury acquittal 
(Sarclad), and in the remaining one a decision is not expected until mid-December 2019 (Serco). This 
is an aspect of negotiated settlements that needs to be kept under review by the authorities, to ensure 
that individual accountability is properly pursued. 
Relatedly, for a company to be convicted in criminal proceedings, it must generally be 
established that a ‘controlling mind’ of that company possessed the necessary mens rea for the 
offence in question.159 Thus, where individual prosecutions subsequent to a DPA are either 
unsuccessful or are not brought – as has happened in four instances to date – companies (or their 
                                                          
151 Rolls-Royce judgment (n.49), para.134. 
152 Theft Act 1968, s.17. 
153 Fraud Act 2006, s.1 and 4. 
154 Zoe Wood and Sarah Butler, Two Tesco directors cleared of fraud as judge labels case ‘weak’, The Guardian, 
December 6, 2018. Subsequently, in January 2019 the SFO offered no evidence against a third individual and he 
was formally acquitted: BBC News, Former Tesco director Carl Rogberg has been acquitted of fraud (January 23, 
2019). 
155 Tesco judgment (n50), para.73. The company is also required to procure the same assistance from Tesco Plc.  
156 Joanna Dimmock, ‘Tesco trial collapse highlights dangers of an early deferred prosecution agreement’ White 
& Case Alert (February 1, 2019). 
157 SFO, SFO closes GlaxoSmithKline investigation and investigation into Rolls-Royce individuals (February 22, 
2019). 
158 SFO, Press Release, ‘Three individuals acquitted as SFO confirms DPA with Sarclad’ (July 16, 2019). 
159 See Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153. For wider consideration, see Neil Cavanagh, ‘Corporate 
Criminal Liability: An Assessment of the Models of Fault’ (2011) 75 JCL 414. 
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shareholders) might question the decision to enter into a DPA. Particularly problematic for the 
individuals concerned is that notwithstanding acquittal in criminal proceedings they might 
nonetheless be identified in (separate) DPA proceedings as having committed criminal conduct.160 
Notably, there is no provision for a judgment or statement of facts to be revised to remove references 
to individuals.161 Thus, where these documents are unredacted at the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings against individuals, those individuals might well have been acquitted162 but are 
nonetheless named and shamed in the DPA documents. One way around this issue is to ensure that 
individual prosecutions are investigated and prosecuted before the DPA is announced (or negotiated). 
That would ensure fairness to individuals, particularly where the criminal proceedings result in an 
acquittal. A further benefit is that, where individual prosecutions are successful, it would demonstrate 
that criminal prosecution is a viable option for the authorities (absent negotiation of a DPA). On the 
other hand, however, if individual prosecutions are unsuccessful then companies are less likely to be 
inclined to negotiate a DPA, given the threat of criminal prosecution of the company is no longer 
viable.163 A second difficulty here is that companies will often be attracted to negotiate a DPA for a 
speedy resolution. If individual prosecutions are to take place first, and of course these are likely to 
take significant time to progress, then there will not be a speedy resolution nor certainty for the 
company.  
   A further consideration related to the terms of a DPA is not strictly concerned with the terms 
themselves, but rather relates to how those terms impact upon parent companies.164 In the Sarclad 
DPA, the parent company (Heico Companies LLC) had offered to provide necessary financial support 
in the event that a DPA was to be agreed, even though ‘there was neither contractual nor legal 
obligation on Heico, as an innocent parent company, to contribute towards a financial penalty 
imposed upon one of its subsidiaries for criminal conduct by that subsidiary.’165 If a subsidiary is 
prosecuted and unable to pay the penalty imposed, then it can be wound up. But, as counsel for 
Sarclad accepted, ‘a parent company receiving financial benefits arising from the unlawful conduct of 
a subsidiary (albeit unknown) must understand how this will be perceived’.166 Heico had in fact 
received £6m in dividends from Sarclad since acquiring it in 2000. It was agreed between Sarclad and 
Heico that, as well as providing financial support to meet the terms of the DPA, Heico would also 
return £1,953,085 of these dividends to Sarclad. In concluding, Leveson P stated: 
‘Before parting from this case, I must underline one further point. Heico was entirely 
ignorant of what had been happening at Sarclad and its conduct when it had intimation 
of the facts has been beyond reproach. Its behaviour and its support for Sarclad have been 
important features in allowing the case to be resolved in the way in which it has.’167 
Where, however, there is evidence that a subsidiary is established as a vehicle through which corrupt 
payments may be made (and can be abandoned in the event of prosecution), then a parent company 
itself will likely face prosecution under section 7 of the Bribery Act. Leveson P emphasised that ‘A 
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preexisting plan to behave corruptly through the subsidiary would obviously be treated as a seriously 
aggravating feature.’168 
 A notable development in this regard is the Serco Agreement, involving a dormant company 
that has no plans for future trading. In that instance, the conduct in question involved both the 
dormant company and its parent company, and the parent company was the ultimate beneficiary. 
However, there was no basis for attributing criminal liability to that parent company.169 While the 
Agreement was with the dormant subsidiary, it actually extends beyond that subsidiary to encompass 
Serco Group PLC and its subsidiaries.170 Thus, Serco Group PLC agreed to pay the financial penalty and 
the SFO’s costs, as well as to implement specified ethics and compliance procedures. This is an 
important development in the context of DPAs. Notwithstanding that the parent company could not 
be prosecuted (nor subject to a DPA itself), ‘it will be the parent company which necessarily must 
engage in any compliance programme and cooperate with law enforcement agencies.’171 
 
CONCLUSION 
Five years on from the introduction of DPAs, it is timely to step back and take stock of developments 
thus far. There have been many plaudits from policymakers and practitioners, most notably in the 
2019 House of Lords Select Committee report.172 Notwithstanding plaudits, this article has deliberately 
struck a note of caution. In concluding, it is useful to stress key areas that will influence the continued 
development of the DPA regime over the coming years.  
Whilst there was initial hope that the adoption of DPAs had ‘the potential to revolutionise the 
approach to corporate criminal liability traditionally adopted in the UK’,173 experiences thus far have 
failed to live up to this expectation. A key aspect of this is, of course, that there are inherent difficulties 
with establishing corporate criminal liability itself. A wider reconsideration of corporate criminal 
liability has not materialised,174 thus should a company not agree a DPA there is often no credible 
threat to that company. Contrast that with the situation in the US, for example, where companies 
know that the threat of prosecution is lurking in the background.175 This threat does not exist in 
England and Wales where the identification principle renders corporate prosecution rare, except in 
cases of small and medium sized businesses. The lack of a credible threat has the potential to 
undermine the DPA regime: as Campbell states ‘It must be recognised that DPAs are introduced as a 
way of mitigating the issues with existing law but still are predicated upon it. If DPAs are to be a useful 
addition to the legal landscape then there must be mutual incentives to agree one, as well as a possible 
alternative for the State to deploy. Even if prosecution is a last resort, it must be viable and feasible.’176 
While there have been some efforts at reform, particularly the adoption of failure to prevent laws, 
such offences are not themselves without controversy.177 Thus, when considering whether DPAs offer 
an alternative – one that is attractive to both the authorities and to companies – it is important to also 
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bear in mind the lack of a credible threat of criminal prosecution. Ultimately, the lack of a credible 
threat of criminal prosecution could undermine other aspects of the DPA regime, considered below.  
 A related point is whether companies will be attracted to enter into a DPA. While there are 
five Agreements to date, and rumours of others being negotiated, so too are there criticisms that the 
DPA regime is not entirely attractive to companies. In particular, the requirement that any financial 
penalty imposed as part of a DPA should be broadly comparable to any fine that would have been 
imposed upon conviction following a guilty plea has given rise to some discontent. For some 
companies, the financial penalty as well as the payment of SFO costs, appointment of a corporate 
monitor, and implementing new compliance/ethics procedures, could be off-putting. On the other 
hand, however, the discount offered – up to 50% - is itself attractive. Moreover, the possibility of 
avoiding debarment rules will be particularly significant for those companies tendering for public 
contracts.178 And, of course, entering into a DPA provides certainty to the company179 and, assuming 
that the terms are complied with, brings criminal proceedings to an end. Thus it remains to be seen 
whether companies will be attracted to enter into a DPA, or whether they will be more inclined to 
adopt a wait-and-see approach and to contest allegations in criminal proceedings in appropriate 
circumstances. We retain concerns, though, in relation to the 50% discount, particularly in the absence 
of self-reporting by the company. Furthermore, the 50% discount reinforces our concerns that 
corporate criminality is differentially enforced.180 
While a DPA can provide certainty, and finality, to the company, the same cannot be said for 
individuals involved in the relevant conduct. Individual prosecutions are an important aspect of any 
negotiated settlement: indeed the House of Lord Select Committee agreed that ‘the DPA process, far 
from being an alternative to the prosecution of individuals, makes it all the more important that 
culpable individuals should be prosecuted’.181 Moreover, it has been suggested that prosecuting 
individuals would represent an additional deterrent.182 To date, however, there have been no 
successful prosecutions of individuals for conduct related to DPAs. Furthermore, in those instances 
where proceedings were instigated, there have been concerns, for example whether it is appropriate 
for a DPA to identify individuals as having engaged in criminality where those individuals are later 
acquitted in criminal proceedings. Indeed, the failure of individual prosecutions in proceedings related 
to the Sarclad and Tesco Agreements might strengthen companies’ resolve to tough it out and to 
decline to enter into DPA negotiations.  
Ultimately, a lot of the contentious issues can be traced to a core difficulty with the DPA 
regime, namely the lack of clarity as to purpose. DPAs were introduced to overcome difficulties in 
prosecuting companies, but also to achieve swift, efficient, cost-effective resolutions. DPAs were 
intended to be effective in tackling corporate crime, but also to encourage self-reporting and self-
policing by companies. So too were they intended to deliver proportionate and effective penalties, 
but also to provide restitution for victims and protection of employees and suppliers.183 Thus, as 
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Bronitt argues, there is a lack of a clear underlying philosophy of justice in the DPA regime.184 This lack 
of a clear philosophy of justice has, perhaps inevitably, resulted in many practical difficulties, as 
evidenced throughout this article. The weak foundations of the DPA regime are problematic: as Jimi 
Hendrix said, ‘castles made of sand fall in the sea, eventually’.185    
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